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Abstract 
For loss averse investors, a sequence of risky investments looks less attractive if it is evaluated 
myopically—an effect called myopic loss aversion (MLA). The consequences of this effect have been 
confirmed in several experiments and its robustness is largely undisputed. The effect’s causes, however, 
have not been thoroughly examined with regard to one important aspect. Due to the construction of the 
lotteries that were used in the experiments, none of the studies is able to distinguish between MLA and an 
explanation based on (myopic) loss probability aversion (MLPA). This distinction is important, however, 
in discussion of the practical relevance and the generalizability of the phenomenon. We designed an 
experiment that is able to disentangle lottery attractiveness and loss probabilities. Our analysis reveals 
that mere loss probabilities are not as important in this dynamic context as previous findings in other 
domains suggest. The results favor the MLA over the MLPA explanation.  
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1. Introduction 
According to myopic loss aversion (MLA) a sequence of lotteries looks less 
attractive if it is evaluated myopically. The effect’s consequences have been 
confirmed in several experimental studies with various settings. Less myopic 
people usually invest more in lotteries than their non-myopic counterparts. The 
robustness of this effect seems largely undisputed. The effect’s causes, however, 
have not been thoroughly analyzed with regard to one important aspect—the 
probability characteristics of the lottery. Our argument can be exemplified by the 
frequently used lottery devised by Gneezy and Potters (1997), with a one-third 
chance of winning 2.5 times the investment amount and a two-thirds chance of 
losing the total amount, denoted by
13/2
5.23/1


. Assuming a loss averse decision 
maker with the two-part value function 
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
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


0 xif5.1
0 xif
)(
x
x
xv , for example, the 
prospective value that the decision maker assigns to the lottery is negative (– 61 ). 
If the decision maker plays the lottery twice and invests the same amount in each 
round the prospective value of the overall distribution is still slightly negative     
(– 91 ). For the frequently used case of a triple draw, however, the evaluation of 
the aggregated distribution increases to + 181 , even though it is composed of 
three draws that have a negative value in isolation. MLA can thus explain why 
decision makers might reject to play or invest less in the lottery if draws are 
evaluated separately (myopic decision maker) but accept it or invest more if draws 
are evaluated in an aggregated way (non-myopic decision maker). MLA, however, 
is not the only possible explanation. 
Although in the given example the loss likelihood for a single draw is relatively 
high, namely 66.7% it reduces to 44.4% for two draws and to only 29.6% for 
three draws. Hence, the decision pattern described in the previous paragraph can 
also be attributed to differences in loss probabilities. We will call this explanation, 
where individuals simply focus on gain and loss probabilities, ―myopic loss 
probability aversion‖ (MLPA). Importantly, this coherence applies to any lottery 
that has been used in the numerous studies on MLA presented in the literature. As 
a consequence, none of the studies is able to distinguish between MLA and 
MLPA. The importance of loss probabilities in decision making has already been 
emphasized and demonstrated (see, for example, Payne 2005 or Diecidue and van 
de Ven 2008). These studies, however, focus on a single decision and do not 
consider the context of repeated decision making. For the case of repeated 
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investing, Langer and Weber (2005, p. 37) state in an analysis on MLA: ―It seems 
that subjects pay more attention to the probabilities of gaining and losing than to 
the respective size of gains and losses.‖ This intuition raises the question whether 
the experimental results presented in the literature are really driven by MLA as is 
frequently claimed or whether MLPA is a better explanation for the observed 
behavior. The key to this question is to disentangle the evaluation according to 
MLA from gain and loss probabilities. We will show that this can easily be 
achieved with lotteries similar to that one of Gneezy and Potters (1997). MLA and 
MLPA make different predictions for these lotteries and we can thus challenge the 
robustness of the MLA explanation. Somewhat surprisingly, our experimental 
analysis reveals that if we assume recently elicited Cumulative Prospect Theory 
preferences, the MLA explanation is favored over MLPA. In the dynamic context 
of repeated investment and myopia, the mere loss probabilities seem to play a 
more minor role than suggested by previous literature. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly 
present the wealth of experimental analyses on MLA. Section 3 formally 
distinguishes between MLA and MLPA. Similarities in the probability 
characteristics of lotteries used in previous studies are discussed in Section 4. In 
Section 5 we disentangle lottery evaluation and loss probabilities before 
presenting the design and results of our experimental investigation in Section 6. 
We conclude in Section 7. 
2. Related Literature 
Originally introduced by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) to explain the equity 
premium puzzle, MLA consists of the two behavioral components loss aversion 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and myopia (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993). The 
first experimental studies on MLA were conducted by Gneezy and Potters (1997) 
and Thaler et al. (1997). The basic idea of these studies was to manipulate 
subjects’ myopia and to analyze their willingness to invest in risky gambles. In 
line with the MLA explanation, participants of both studies invested more in the 
risky lottery when they were manipulated to be less myopic. Later studies 
confirmed these findings and analyzed further aspects of MLA while the majority 
of studies were based on the original experimental setting of Gneezy and Potters 
(1997). Gneezy et al. (2003) confirmed the effect in a market setting. Here, 
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myopia led to lower prices for risky assets. Haigh and List (2005) demonstrated 
the practical relevance of the phenomenon by showing that the effect is stronger 
for professional traders than for students. Bellemare et al. (2005), Langer and 
Weber (2008), and Fellner and Sutter (2009) analyzed whether the effect is driven 
by feedback frequency or investment flexibility. The results of these studies are 
ambiguous and give no clear answer to the question. Sutter (2007) confirmed the 
MLA effect for groups of individuals. Fellner and Sutter (2009) showed that if 
individuals are given the choice between high and low feedback frequency and 
investment flexibility, they prefer frequent feedback and high investment 
flexibility, even if informed that this might reduce their investment success by 
inducing myopia. In a study more closely related to our own study, Langer and 
Weber (2005) challenged the robustness of MLA by analyzing different lotteries. 
The study revealed theoretically and experimentally that there is a reverse effect 
for ―loan-type‖ lotteries, i.e. lotteries with small loss probabilities in combination 
with relatively large losses. The results are explained by extending the MLA 
concept to myopic prospect theory (MPT), i.e. adding further elements of 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), namely diminishing value sensitivity and—
not necessarily—probability weighting.1 Haisley et al. (2008) reveal a myopic 
risk-seeking effect by analyzing purchases of state lottery tickets; the results are 
explained by the ―peanuts effect‖ (Prelec and Loewenstein 1991). Hopfensitz and 
Wranik (2008, p. 1) analyzed psychological reasons for the myopia effect. The 
authors found that ―stable individual differences lead to different evaluations and 
emotional reactions concerning feedback‖. Papon (2008) confirmed the 
explanatory power of MLA within an insurance context. Redelmeier and Tversky 
(1992), Benartzi and Thaler (1999), and Langer and Weber (2001) demonstrated 
MLA for presentation modes. In their experiments, subjects usually showed 
higher acceptance rates for risky choices if aggregated rather than segregated 
return distributions were provided. 
                                                 
1
 Strictly speaking, loss aversion in (Cumulative) Prospect Theory is not only determined by the 
shape of the utility function but also by the probability weighting function (see, for example, 
Schmidt and Zank 2005, 2008).
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3. Loss Aversion vs. Loss Probability Aversion 
The difference between the two explanations MLA/MPT on the one hand and 
MLPA on the other hand is probably best illustrated by referring to the model 
proposed by Diecidue and van de Ven (2008). The attractiveness or valuation V of 
a prospect ),,...,,( 11 nn pxpxX   with outcomes xi and associated probabilities pi 
is given in their model by: 
   

 xxμxvpXV
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where v is a continuous value function with v(0)=0, P( x ) and P( x ) denote the 
prospect’s overall probability of gaining and losing, and μ≥0 and λ≥0 are weights 
for these probabilities. Diecidue and van de Ven (2008) have shown that such a 
multi-component evaluation model can easily be transformed into a standard 
evaluation model of the form   
n
1i ii
xupXV )()( where the value function u(x) 
features a specific type of discontinuity around the origin. More explicitly, it 
holds: 
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An exemplary value function u(x) is illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 1.  
CPT as proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), on which MLA/MPT are 
based upon, does not put extra weights on mere gain and loss probabilities and 
thus does not assume a discontinuity of the evaluation around the reference point. 
Under MLA/MPT μ and λ are thus set to 0 and it holds    xvxu  . For MLA, the 
value function v is linear in both gain and loss domain; for MPT diminishing 
value sensitivity is further assumed (see Figure 1).
2
 For both MLA and MPT, the 
value function is usually steeper in the loss than in the gain domain to induce loss 
aversion. 
Under MLPA, individuals only focus on gain and loss probabilities and disregard 
the outcomes’ size; v(x) is set to 0 and the general model in Eq. 1 reduces to 
     xxμXV )( . The higher the gain and lower the loss probability of 
                                                 
2
 For MPT including probability weighting the probabilities pi have to be substituted by weights wi 
dependent on the probability weighting function. 
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the prospect, the higher is the associated attractiveness. While representing a 
relatively extreme definition, recall that MLPA preferences can explain all 
experimental studies on MLA/MPT presented in the literature as it predicts 
investment amounts of subjects to be higher for lower loss probabilities and vice 
versa (we will show this in detail in Section 4).  
Figure 1: Value Functions for MLA, MPT, and MLPA 
 
Figure 1 shows a value function u(x) for the general model of Diecidue and van den Ven (2008) (dotted line) 
and three value functions for the special cases of MLA, MPT, and MLPA. 
4. Loss Probability Characteristics in MLA 
Experiments 
The majority of experimental investigations on MLA rely on the original study 
design of Gneezy and Potters (1997) and their lottery, henceforth ―GP lottery‖. 
Examples are the studies of Gneezy et al. (2003), Bellemare et al. (2005), Haigh 
and List (2005), Sutter (2007), and Fellner and Sutter (2009). As outlined in the 
introduction, the GP lottery has a high loss probability of 66.7% for a single draw 
compared with only 29.6% for a triple draw. The reason is that an overall loss will 
only be realized in the case of three consecutive losses. Two gains and one loss 
still lead to a small overall gain. For the lottery 
%36.0
%74.0


, used by Langer and 
Weber (2008), loss probabilities are 60% (single draw) and 47.5% (fourfold 
draw).
3
 Also the loss probabilities in Redelmeier and Tversky (1992) and in 
                                                 
3
 Experimental studies on MLA used different numbers of draws for the multiple draw case. We will only 
mention the number of draws that have actually been used in the respective experiment. 
x 
 xu
v(x) 
μ 
λ 
MLPA 
MPT 
MLA 
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Langer and Weber (2001) are considerably lower in the multiple draw case: For 
the lottery 
$2005.0
$20005.0


 the figures are 50.0% (single draw) versus 3.1% (fivefold 
draw). For the three lotteries of Langer and Weber (2001), i.e. 
DM
DM
2007.0
22003.0


, 
DM
DM
2008.0
23002.0


, and 
DM
DM
12003.0
13007.0


, loss likelihoods are substantially lower in the 
multiple draw case, too. The same argument applies to 
%1005.0
%2005.0


 analyzed by 
Langer and Weber (2005). Evidently, in all cases, the loss probability for a single 
draw is considerably higher than the one for multiple draws in aggregated 
evaluation. An overview of lotteries with loss probabilities is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Loss Probabilities of Lotteries used in Experiments on Myopic Loss Aversion 
Panel A: Studies Using Intertemporal Experimental Design 
 Gneezy and 
Potters (1997) 
and others 
Langer and 
Weber (2008) 
Langer and 
Weber (2005) 
Langer and 
Weber (2005) 
(reverse effect) 
Langer and 
Weber (2005) 
(reverse effect) 
Lottery 
Description %1003/2
%2503/1


 
%36.0
%74.0


 %1005.0
%2005.0


 
%1001.0
%159.0


 
%1001.0
%309.0


 
Loss Probability 
Single Draw 
66.7% 60.0% 50.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
Loss Probability 
Multiple Draw 
29.6% (3x) 47.5% (4x) 12.5% (3x) 27.1% (3x) 27.1% (3x) 
 
Panel B: Studies Focusing on Presentation Forms 
 Redelmeier and 
Tversky (1992) 
Langer and 
Weber (2001) 
Langer and 
Weber (2001) 
Langer and 
Weber (2001) 
Langer and 
Weber (2001) 
(reverse effect) 
Lottery 
Description $5005.0
$20005.0


 DM
DM
3007.0
22003.0


 
DM
DM
2008.0
23002.0


 
DM
DM
12003.0
13007.0


 
DM
DM
210004.0
40096.0


 
Loss Probability 
Single Draw 
50.0% 70.0% 80.0% 30.0% 4.0% 
Loss Probability 
Multiple Draw 
3.1% (5x) 
49.0% (2x) 64.0% (2x) 
9.0% (2x) 
7.8% (2x) 
16.8% (5x) 32.8% (5x) 18.5% (5x) 
Table 1 shows loss probabilities of lotteries that have been used in experimental studies on MLA. 
Panel A shows lotteries used within intertemporal experimental designs, Panel B shows lotteries of 
studies focusing on presentation forms. The number of draws for the multiple draw case is given in 
brackets. 
Our observation not only holds true for the typical MLA effect for which myopia 
decreases lotteries’ attractiveness but also for the reverse case discussed by 
Langer and Weber (2001, 2005), for which myopia increases lotteries’ 
attractiveness (the reverse case can only be explained by extending MLA to 
MPT). For the reverse effect, lotteries’ loss probabilities are higher in the 
aggregated, i.e. non-myopic, case (and prospective values are lower here). For the 
lottery 
DM
DM
210004.0
40096.0


, used in Langer and Weber (2001), the loss probability 
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increases from 4.0% (single draw) to 7.8% (double draw) and finally to 18.5% 
(fivefold draw). For the similar lotteries in the same authors’ 2005 study, 
%1001.0
%159.0


 and 
%1001.0
%309.0


, loss probabilities equal 10.0% (single draw) and 
27.1% (triple draw).  
We conclude that for all lotteries used in previous studies, MLA/MPT on the one 
hand and MLPA on the other make the same predictions. Lower lottery 
attractiveness according to MLA/MPT always accompanies a higher loss 
probability and vice versa. As a consequence, although the myopia effect has been 
generally confirmed, none of the studies presented in the literature is able to 
distinguish between MLA/MPT and the MLPA explanation (since MPT includes 
MLA as a special case, we will only use the term MPT in the following unless we 
explicitly refer to MLA).   
5. Lottery Calibration 
The question whether investments in the lottery are driven by MPT or MLPA can 
be addressed experimentally. A higher MPT evaluation (for the single or the 
multiple draw) is not necessarily accompanied by a lower loss probability. It is 
easy to construct examples of lotteries that have almost identical MPT evaluations 
whereas their loss probabilities are fundamentally different. A striking example is 
given by the lottery set G 
%1003/2
%2303/1


 and Z 
%1006.0
%1904.0


. G exhibits the same loss 
probabilities as the frequently used GP lottery and thus serves as a robustness 
check for our experimental results.
4
 While G and Z show similar loss probabilities 
in the single draw case (66.7% vs. 60.0%), the lotteries’ loss probabilities differ 
substantially in the triple draw case, namely 29.6% for G compared with 64.8% 
for Z (in the following we will refer to treatment L for the case of three draws and 
to treatment H for single draws). The reason is that for Z, two losses and one gain 
lead to a loss, whereas for G, two losses and one gain still lead to a gain. Table 2 
summarizes key characteristics of our lottery set. According to MLPA, lottery Z is 
much more attractive in the multiple draw case than G predicting higher 
investment levels for Z compared with G. 
 
                                                 
4
 We expect to observe a similar myopia effect for lottery G to that in other studies.  
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Table 2: Loss Probability Characteristics of Lotteries G and Z 
  Lottery G  Lottery Z 
   
%1003/2
%2303/1


 
 
 
%1006.0
%1904.0


 
Loss Probability Single Draw 
(Treatment H) 
 66.7%  60.0% 
Loss Probability Triple Draw 
(Treatment L) 
 29.6%  64.8% 
Table 2 shows loss probabilities for lotteries G and Z in the segregated (single draw) and 
aggregated (triple draw) case. 
Remember that our main objective was to generate a lottery set with considerably 
different loss probabilities (and thus different evaluation according to MLPA) but 
identical attractiveness according to MPT. After having achieved the first 
objective of unequal loss probabilities, we have to assess how attractive G and Z 
are in a MPT valuation. One possibility would be to evaluate lotteries’ 
attractiveness using CPT parameters of a representative individual.
5
 This 
approach, however, would not account for preference heterogeneity. Therefore, 
we follow a more universal approach and employ a set of individually elicited 
CPT preference parameters. We use these preference parameters to calculate 
predicted investment amounts for G and Z. The set consists of 73 parameter 
combinations elicited by Zeisberger et al. (2010) and builds on the two-part value 
function (Eq. 3) and probability weighting function (Eq. 4, separately applied for 
gain and loss domain) as proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992):
6
 






0 if)(
0 if
)(
xx
xx
xv



 (3) 
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
/1
1
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

 . (4) 
                                                 
5
 The most common parameters are the median parameters elicited by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992), i.e. α = β = 0.88, δ+ = 0.61, δ- = 0.69, and λ = 2.25 (see Eq. 3 and 4). 
6
 As a robustness check we also analyzed the dataset that was used by Langer and Weber (2005) 
and provided by George Wu. The results for the two datasets are very similar. We thus refrain 
from reporting respective results for the Wu dataset. The interested reader can obtain the data from 
the authors on request.  
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Median values amount to α = 0.98, β = 0.88, δ+ = 0.90, δ- = 0.76, and λ = 1.38 (for 
individual parameters see Zeisberger et al. 2010). Employing this dataset we can 
calculate the theoretical attractiveness according to CPT for lotteries G and Z in 
both treatments. As in other studies on MPT (e.g. Gneezy et al. 2003 or Langer 
and Weber 2005), we hereby assume individuals evaluate lottery sequences in 
treatment L in an aggregated (non-myopic) manner, i.e. evaluating the combined 
return distribution. In treatment H we assume that individuals evaluate lottery 
draws in a segregated (myopic) way, i.e. each lottery by itself. Based on this 
setting, we calculate investment amounts predicted by CPT for both lotteries and 
both treatments, giving us a prediction of the myopia effect’s strength. We assume 
that a subject will invest that amount of money that yields the highest CPT value.  
Our assumption that individuals in treatment H (L) will strictly evaluate single 
(triple) draws might be seen as relatively restrictive. Relaxing this assumption and 
considering a probabilistic model of myopia as in Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009) 
however, would only lower the variance of our predicted investment amounts and 
would thus not change our qualitative results. Another critical aspect might be the 
poor forecasting abilities of CPT on the individual level as observed, for example, 
by Erner et al. (2009). We do not aim, however, at predicting exact investment 
amounts; we are only interested in the relative attractiveness of G and Z in both 
treatments. Langer and Weber (2005) successfully applied the same approach to 
predict and validate a reverse myopia effect. Therefore, the direction and 
existence of the myopia effect might well be predicted by the method we apply.  
Table 3 displays the predictions of investment amounts by CPT based on the 
above mentioned preference set. The values and myopia effect are almost equal 
between both lotteries, which was our second objective in the lottery calibration. 
The results show that lotteries G and Z are equally attractive according to CPT 
whereas their loss likelihoods differ substantially (and thereby their attractiveness, 
according to MLPA). This conclusion does not only hold true for CPT with all its 
characteristics, i.e. loss aversion, value sensitivity, and probability weighting, but 
also for restricted forms of CPT, namely assuming a linear value function and/or 
linear probability weighting.
7
 These restricted forms of CPT can be motivated by 
                                                 
7
 For the calculation of these restricted CPT forms we fix particular variables of the value and 
probability weighting function at 1 and re-estimate all other variables using the estimation 
technique and data of Zeisberger et al (2010). Based on these modified preference sets (accounting 
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findings of Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2009), Haisley et al. (2008), and Hertwig et 
al. (2008). In a nutshell, the fact that lotteries G and Z are similarly attractive 
according to MPT is very robust also for variations of CPT functional 
specifications. 
Table 3: Investment Proportions for Lotteries G and Z Predicted by CPT 
Lottery G  Lottery Z 
%1003/2
%2303/1


 
 
%1006.0
%1904.0


 
Treatment L Treatment H Difference  Treatment L Treatment H Difference 
56% 41% 15%  62% 49% 13% 
Table 3 shows investment amounts in the lottery for lotteries G and Z predicted by CPT, based on 
a dataset by Zeisberger et al. (2010). The 56% for treatment L and lottery G, for example, indicates 
that employing the CPT preference dataset elicited by Zeisberger et al. (2010) the predicted 
average investment in the lottery is 56%. 
Encouraged by a pre-test
8
 of the experiment and the results observed in other 
domains, we have more confidence in the MLPA explanation rather than MPT (or 
restricted forms of MPT). Of course, (pure) MLPA as outlined in Section 3 
represents a rather extreme case, but if loss probabilities play a role we should 
observe a difference in average investment amounts between G and Z in treatment 
L. Our first hypothesis is that the average (median) amount invested in the lottery 
( r ) is higher in treatment L than in H for lottery G, i.e. we expect the well-
documented myopia effect (which is predicted by MPT as well as MLPA) also for 
this slight modification of the GP lottery. For lottery Z, however, the MLPA 
explanation predicts r  to be slightly lower in treatment L than in H (Hypothesis 
2). Owing to the large loss probability difference, MLPA furthermore makes the 
more explicit prediction that r  is higher for lottery G than for Z in treatment L 
(Hypothesis 3). 
Hypothesis 1:    HL GrGr   
Hypothesis 2:    HL ZrZr   
                                                                                                                                     
for linear value function and/or linear probability weighting) we again calculated predicted 
investment amounts. 
8
 The results of the pre-test pointed rather in the direction of the MLPA explanation. The lottery 
calibration applied in the pre-test was based on the median CPT parameters elicited by Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992) only.  
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Hypothesis 3:    LL ZrGr   
6. Experimental Investigation 
6.1 Experimental Set-Up 
Our analysis of the suitability of the MLPA explanation is tested in a 
computerized laboratory experiment, building on the study design of Gneezy and 
Potters (1997). A total of 190 undergraduate students of the University of Münster 
(Germany) took part in the experiment in January 2009. The students were 
recruited from a finance course. The mean age of participants was 22.9 years 
(median: 23) and 27.2% were female. Subjects were randomly assigned in equal 
numbers to the four treatment-lottery combinations, i.e. treatments H and L in 
combination with lotteries G and Z. The experiment comprised 36 rounds in each 
of which subjects were endowed with a hypothetical 1€. Subjects repeatedly had 
to decide about the proportion to allocate to the lottery (between 0 and 1€; see 
Appendix A for a sample screen). Realized gains of the lottery and non-invested 
capital were not available in later rounds. 
To manipulate myopia, high and low frequency groups were constructed as in 
Gneezy and Potters (1997). Hence, subjects in treatment H (high-frequency 
group) received feedback and were able to decide about the investment amount in 
each round. In treatment L (low-frequency group), feedback was only provided 
after three consecutive rounds and decisions were binding for the same interval. 
Instructions were provided on the computer screen (see Appendix B for full 
instructions). Participants were informed about the characteristics of the lottery 
and details of the treatment in advance and were also encouraged to ask questions 
at any time in case they did not understand the task. 
To provide a monetary incentive, one-tenth of the subjects were randomly chosen 
to be paid in real money the amount they realized in the experiment (variable 
payment). In addition, a fixed amount of 5€ was paid to every subject for 
attending.
9
 The experiment’s duration was 15 minutes on average, and variable 
                                                 
9
 The experiment was an independent part of a larger experiment which explains the relatively 
high fixed payment. 
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payment ranged from 23.25€ to 71.92€. All subjects were informed about 
payment details beforehand. 
6.2 Results  
The main results of the experiment are depicted in Table 4. We observe mean 
investment over all rounds in the lottery for G of 55.9% in treatment L compared 
with 48.9% in treatment H (median figures: 52.5% vs. 46.5%). The difference is 
marginally significant (p-value one-sided Mann-Whitney-U test: 8.2%). We can 
thus reject the null hypothesis that  LGr  is lower than  HGr  and deliver some 
weak support for our Hypothesis 1. Hence, a myopia effect, even though less 
pronounced than in previous studies, is also observed for the minor variation of 
the frequently used GP lottery. In contrast with Hypothesis 2, and thus 
surprisingly, a myopia effect in the same direction is also observed for lottery Z, 
i.e.    HL ZrZr  . The difference in investment values between treatments L and 
H for lottery Z is significant—but in the opposite direction from our hypothesis—
with a p-value of 5.1%.
10
 Mean values amount to 55.8% in treatment L and 48.7% 
in H, the difference in medians being slightly higher (55.0% vs. 46.4%). 
Interestingly, the mean investment values for G and Z are almost identical, i.e. the 
myopia effect is equally pronounced. 
The fact that average investment amounts do not differ for both lotteries also 
indicates that our Hypothesis 3, namely that the average investment in the lottery 
in treatment L is lower for Z than for G, has to be rejected. The difference 
between median investment amounts for G and Z is negligible: 52.5% compared 
with 55.0% (p-value: 34.5 %). Hence, our MLPA argument does not hold for 
lotteries G and Z, and the decision behavior cannot be explained solely or 
primarily by loss likelihoods. On the contrary, our results give support to the MPT 
explanation. We observe very similar investment amounts between lotteries G and 
Z in treatment H, too. Summing up, our results correspond well with the 
qualitative predictions of Table 3, i.e. the existence of a myopia effect for both 
lotteries regardless of the large difference in loss probabilities in treatment L. 
These results are robust over the 36 rounds of the experiment. 
                                                 
10
 Strictly speaking, this is the p-value for the alternative hypothesis    LH ZrZr  , which follows 
from the MPT explanation. 
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Table 4: Mean Investment Amounts in the Lotteries G and Z 
 
 Lottery G  Lottery Z 
Round  
Treatment 
L 
Treatment 
H 
Mann-Whitney z  Treatment L Treatment H Mann-Whitney z 
1–3  48.4 50.1 –0.45 (0.672)  52.9 42.0 1.60 (0.055) 
4–6  55.5 49.7 0.78 (0.218)  54.6 46.9 1.21 (0.113) 
7–9  54.3 55.4 –0.35 (0.635)  51.7 51.7 0.06 (0.476) 
10–12  58.8 47.5 1.55 (0.060)  54.8 48.3 0.98 (0.164) 
13–15  55.2 48.1 0.84 (0.201)  58.8 51.6 1.07 (0.142) 
16–18  55.8 46.1 1.30 (0.097)  53.6 46.3 1.02 (0.154) 
19–21  60.6 51.1 1.46 (0.072)  56.6 50.3 0.93 (0.176) 
22–24  55.8 45.9 1.15 (0.126)  61.4 47.8 2.16 (0.015) 
25–27  55.4 44.9 1.56 (0.060)  61.3 47.3 2.10 (0.018) 
28–30  55.9 45.7 1.38 (0.083)  56.4 50.0 1.01 (0.157) 
31–33  51.7 48.8 0.42 (0.338)  52.7 51.1 0.32 (0.375) 
34–36  63.3 53.4 1.35 (0.088)  55.3 50.9 0.70 (0.241) 
1–36  55.9 48.9 1.39 (0.082)  55.8 48.7 1.63 (0.051) 
Table 4 shows mean investment amounts in the lotteries G and Z for treatments L and H. The last 
column for each lottery shows Mann-Whitney z-values and significance levels (p-values) for the 
one-sided test in brackets; hypotheses:    LH GrGr   and    LH ZrZr  . 
7. Conclusion 
The relevance of myopia for the willingness to invest in risky assets was 
convincingly demonstrated in a number of experimental studies. Myopic loss 
aversion (MLA) and the more general concept myopic Prospect Theory (MPT) 
are commonly used to explain the phenomenon. The robustness of the effect and 
its generalizability to various fields of application is rarely disputed in the 
literature. As we point out in this paper, however, all experimental studies on 
MLA and MPT were constructed in such a way that higher evaluations under 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) accompany lower loss probabilities in the 
different treatments. As a consequence, none of the studies presented in the 
literature is able to distinguish between the MLA (MPT) concept and an 
explanation that we named myopic loss probability aversion (MLPA). MLPA 
claims that the higher attractiveness of the investment options in non-myopic 
evaluation is driven by the lower loss probability rather than the higher CPT 
evaluation. It is important to distinguish between MLA (MPT) and MLPA, 
because the concepts make the same qualitative predictions for most, but not for 
all lottery types. Thus, attributing the empirical observations to the wrong 
explanation might lead to a misinterpretation of the robustness of the phenomenon 
and its generalizability. 
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By a careful design of the lotteries in our study, we are able to distinguish 
between the competing explanations. Somewhat surprisingly, our results favor the 
MLA (MPT) over the MLPA argument. In this specific context, the attractiveness 
of lotteries seems to be better explained by CPT evaluations than by loss 
probabilities. The results are interesting, as previous studies in other domains 
revealed a strong influence of gain and loss probabilities on individual decision 
behavior (e.g. Payne 2005), although these findings refer to single decision 
making. We do not want to overplay our findings, though. What can be learned 
from the large body of research on myopia and investment is that there is 
obviously considerable heterogeneity in individual behavior and minor design 
issues that had not been considered to be relevant beforehand might have a major 
impact on the results.
11
 We ourselves had this experience in a pre-test for this 
study, in which MLPA was actually slightly favored over the MLA (MPT) 
explanation. Even though we have to underplay the relevance of the pre-test 
findings somewhat as the lotteries of that study were not as rigorously calibrated 
as the lotteries in the main study, it is still puzzling that such minor design 
modifications can cause such essential result changes. A possible explanation is 
that actual decision behavior might best be explained by a flexible model as 
proposed by Diecidue and van de Ven 2008, combining MLA (MPT) and MLPA. 
We thus hope that our research will be considered above all as an interesting 
starting point that inspires extended replications and further projects on this 
specific issue and on related questions.  
 
                                                 
11
 A good example is the research on the causes of myopia (feedback frequency vs. commitment) 
in this field. The findings of Bellemare et al. (2005) seemed to provide a clear and convincing 
picture, but were later challenged by Langer and Weber (2008) as well as Fellner and Sutter 
(2009).  
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Appendix A: Experiment Example Screen 
 
 
This figure shows a sample screen as it appeared in the main part of the experiment (translated from German). 
 20 
Appendix B: Experimental Instructions (Translated from German) 
Dear Participant, 
Welcome to the experiment that was announced at the beginning. This experiment 
will take approx. 10-15 minutes time. It is independent of the other experiments 
and will also be paid independently. We will randomly draw one tenth of all 
subjects. This drawing is independent of the drawing for the other experiment. 
Your expected value for payment if you are chosen will be approx. 40 Euros.  
The experiment comprises 36 rounds. In these rounds, you will have to make 
investment decisions, which will shortly be explained to you.  
If you are randomly chosen for payment you will receive the amount you realized 
in the 36 rounds. Therefore, all rounds are relevant for the payment. As a 
consequence, you should think carefully about all of your decisions. 
If there is still any lack of clarity at any point in the experiment, please raise your 
hand and the supervisor will help you immediately. 
You will play a total of 36 rounds. In each round you will receive an investment 
amount of 1.00€. 
You will have to decide how much of this monetary endowment you want to 
invest in a risky investment form. The risk profile of this investment form is 
identical in all rounds and is as follows: 
There is a probability of 33.3% that you will win 2.3 times your investment 
(+230%) and a probability of 66.7% that you will lose the complete amount 
invested (-100%). 
The actual results of the risky investments will be generated randomly and 
individually for you during the experiment by the computer, taking into account 
the given probabilities. We want to stress that there will be no manipulations. You 
can rely on the results from your investments being derived from the given 
probabilities. The results of successive rounds are independent of one another, i.e. 
the results of previous rounds do not influence the result-probabilities in the 
following rounds. 
Let us look at three examples: 
1
st
 example: You do not invest anything in the risky investment form. In this case 
you keep your 1.00€, and you will thus neither make a gain nor a loss, regardless 
of the return of the risky investment form.  
2
nd
 example: You invest all of the 1.00€ in the risky investment form. If the risky 
investment form develops positively you will gain 2.3 times the amount invested, 
i.e. 2.30€, and will end up with 3.30€. If the risky investment form develops 
negatively you will lose the 1.00€ and will end up with nothing in that round. 
3
rd
 example: You invest half of the investment amount, i.e. 0.50€. If the 
investment form develops positively you will gain 2.3 times the amount invested, 
i.e. 1.15€, and will end up with 1.65€. If the risky investment form develops 
negatively you will lose the 0.50€ and will end up with the non-invested 0.50€ in 
that round. 
The acquired capital will be credited to your payout account and will not be 
available for investment in later rounds. Instead, in each round you will be 
provided with a new endowment of 1.00€. 
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Treatment H 
Before each round, you have to decide anew what amount (between 0 and 1€) you 
want to invest in the risky investment. After each round, you will be told how the 
investment developed and what gain or loss you made. 
Treatment L 
Your decision on what amount you invest in the risky investment form is binding 
for three rounds and cannot be changed within these three rounds. Not until after 
these three rounds, can you choose a new amount, which will then again be 
binding for the following three rounds. You will also not be told what gain or loss 
you made before the three rounds have ended. This means that, although 36 
rounds will be played, you will only make 12 decisions for three rounds each. 
General Instruction (contd.): 
You can either enter the desired investment amount via the keyboard or use the 
mouse to adjust the amount on the scrollbar. Please note that you can only enter 
whole amounts of cents (no decimal point). 
